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Abstract: In cyberspace attackers enjoy an advantage over defenders, which has popularized the concept of “active cyber defense”—
offensive actions intended to punish or deter the adversary. This
article argues active cyber defense is not a practical course of action
to obtain tactical and strategic objectives. Instead, “aggressive cyber
defense,” a proactive security solution, is a more appropriate option.

T

he ability to retaliate against cyber attackers—irrespective of
the legalities of such actions—appears to have gained traction
in the United States government, but is it a practical response
for achieving tactical and strategic objectives in cyberspace? Attribution
limitations, collateral damage considerations, the Internet’s global architecture, and potential event escalation make the challenges of engaging
in active cyber defense an ineffective course of action destined to achieve
limited tactical successes at best; and it risks accelerating digital as well as
physical conflict. Too many variables prevent active cyber defense deterring or punishing adversaries in cyberspace. For that reason, this article
advocates a more productive solution—aggressive cyber defense—to
frustrate attackers via nondestructive or damaging activities.

A Note on Terminology

There are no internationally accepted definitions for “cyber attack”
and “active cyber defense.” In its 2011 Strateg y for Operating in Cyberspace,
the US Department of Defense defines active cyber defense as:
. . . synchronized, real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze, and
mitigate threats and vulnerabilities . . . it operates at network speed by using
sensors, software, and intelligence to detect and stop malicious activity
before it can affect DOD networks and systems.1

Using this designation as a baseline, the following definitions have been
adopted for the purposes of this article:
•• Cyber Attack: Actions ranging from network exploitation for information collection/data theft to attacks designed to deny, degrade,
disrupt, or destroy an information system, an information network,
or the information resident on them. Examples include distributed
denial-of-service attacks, the insertion of malware designed to destroy
information systems, or the information resident on them such as
Stuxnet or Shamoon.
•• Active Cyber Defense: A range of offensive damaging or destructive
actions, such as counterhacking, that engage an adversary during or
1      US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Washington,
DC: US Department of Defense, July 2011); http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf.
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promptly after an initial cyber attack. Active cyber defense does not
include nonviolent actions such as diplomatic or economic sanctions.
Examples include counterhacking and technical countermeasures
with weaponized payloads.
•• Passive Cyber Defense: A range of cyber defensive actions taken to
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information
systems and networks through the use of layered network security
devices, processes, and countermeasures to protect the integrity of the
information assets in an enterprise. Examples include firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and host-based intrusion detection systems.
•• Aggressive Cyber Defense: A range of aggressive passive and active
defensive actions to be used in concert with one another that identify,
deceive, and frustrate attackers into giving up and moving elsewhere.
Examples include severing connections between targeted computers
and the attacking command and control servers, as well as redirecting
hostile traffic to a benign target or destination.

Active Cyber Defense

The United States faces increasing cyber threats capable of targeting private and public sectors from a diverse actor set. Director of US
National Intelligence James Clapper identified cyber as the top threat
facing the United States, over traditional high profile threats such as
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.2 Cyber crime, hacktivistrelated distributed denial-of-service attacks, and cyber espionage have
prompted policymakers to develop deterrence strategies. The United
States, as well as the governments of Canada,3 France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom, have developed and published cybersecurity strategies
acknowledging the severity of this threat, as well categorizing the actors
suspected of perpetrating it.4
Opponents of passive cyber defense quickly point out there has
been limited success in mitigating hostile activity via conventional cyber
defense practices. Active cyber defense seemingly remains the only real
solution to deter or stop aggressive cyber actors.5 This concept is not
new; the cybersecurity research community has discussed active cyber
defense for nearly a decade.6 However, for it to be effective, an active
cyber defense program must be able to:
2     Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US
Intelligence Community, James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, January 29, 2014).
3     Government of Canada, Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/
rsrcs/pblctns/cbr-scrt-strtgy/cbr-scrt-strtgy-eng.pdf.
4     The White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace (Washington, DC: The White House, May
2011); Government of Canada, Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/
pblctns/cbr-scrt-strtgy/cbr-scrt-strtgy-eng.pdf.; Agencie Nationale de la Securite des Systemes d’Information,
Information Systems Defence and Security – France’s Strategy, http://www.ssi.gouv.fr /IMG/pdf/2011-0215_Information_system_defence_and_security_-_France_s_strategy.pdf; Federal Ministry of the
Interior, Cyber Security Strategy for Germany, http://www.cio.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/
DE/Strategische-Themen/css_engl_download.pdf;jsessionid=065625A05192FE06B3F0C34A8
9E935B3.2_cid093?__blob=publicationFile; Government of the United Kingdom, The UK Cyber
Security Strategy, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/60961/uk-cyber-security-strategy-final.pdf.
5     Ellen Nakashima, “Cybersecurity Should Be More Active, Official Says,” Washington Post,
September 16, 2012.
6     Jody Westby, “Caution: Active Response to Cyber Attacks Has High Risk,” Forbes.com,
November 11, 2012.
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1. Correctly identify the originator of the cyber attack or an impending
cyber attack
2. Determine why the attack happened or will happen and be prepared
to launch a cyber response with commensurate power and effect
A retaliatory action should cause more harm than the original attack,
and as a result, thereby deterring or halting an attack. But can such a
goal be obtained?
Certain conditions must be in place prior to implementing active
cyber defense. First, a state must have, and communicate to, the international community that it has a red line for tolerance of hostile cyber
activity against its networks. Equally important is that this threshold be
manageable; a state must be able to deliver on a promised reprisal. For
example, a zero-tolerance policy is unfeasible in an age where the volume
of hostile cyber activity ranges from aggressive network scanning, to
surreptitious network exploitation, to assertive distributed denial-ofservice attacks from the large and diverse threat actor landscape.7 A
state could exhaust personnel and financial resources very quickly trying
to address every possible threat.
Second, and a corollary to communication, is signaling. Whether
in peacetime or war, a key element of any active cyber defense strategy
includes the ability to signal intentions to the receiver properly. Without
the ability to signal, active cyber defense runs the risk of being misunderstood or misinterpreted, increasing the danger of conflict escalation.
What’s more, the signaling nation must have established credibility
conducting successful and destructive cyber retaliation. If the adversary
does not believe the credibility of a signaling state, signaling efforts will
fail.
The third necessary condition is the capability to deliver an appropriate cyber response. Proper proportionality eliminates the need to “kill
a cockroach with a rocket launcher” when simply stepping on it would
suffice. A disproportionate response runs the risk of escalating conflict.
Fourth, a state must determine if the cyber attack was intentional and
not a mistake, a misunderstanding, or the result of collateral damage.
Fifth, and perhaps most important, a state must determine attribution
and be willing to accept the risk of being wrong.
Attribution is not easy. Several technical measures as well as operator tactics, techniques, and procedures readily obfuscate a hostile cyber
actor’s true country of origin. Anonymizers, proxies, and the use of a
series of compromised computers in different countries or “hop points”
all impede technical attribution. Furthermore, operational security measures and an increasingly sophisticated malware environment (such as
multi-functional rootkits) pose real challenges to identifying individuals
conducting nefarious activities. Prior to engaging active cyber defense,
attribution must be conclusive to ensure the right target is in the cross
hairs and the initial attack was intentional. Therein lies the heart of the
problem—the ability to identify the intent and identity of the attacker
conclusively.
Antagonistic cyber actors can be cast into two categories: the opportunistic hacker and the focused hacker. The former will take advantage
7     Martin Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009).
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of a vulnerability and attempt to exploit it regardless of the target;
whereas the latter—whether a state or those actors working on behalf
of one—identifies specific targets to exploit. While the tactical objective
of active cyber defense is the original attacker, the strategic objective
is the decision maker—whether the leadership of a government or a
group of nonstate actors. Therefore, active cyber defense must achieve
two objectives: 1) make adversarial efforts economically or punitively
impractical so they stop, and presumably, go on to another target; and 2)
cause the decision making authority to stop directing the hostile activity.
In its 2011 strategy, the Department of Defense determined hostile
cyber activity included the persistent theft of proprietary information
as a justified reason to conduct active cyber defense.8 However, there
are several challenges and potential pitfalls to engaging in this type of
cyber retaliation, even if governments focus efforts exclusively on actors
engaged in sophisticated cyber attacks:
•• Multiple Computers. One goal of active cyber defense is to touch the
adversary’s computer digitally. But this rationale appears predicated
on assuming the attacker has access to, or only uses, one computer.
If resourced by a foreign government, it is extremely likely actors will
have more than one computer at their disposal. Should an active cyber
strike destroy one computer, the others could continue. A second
computer would have a new IP address, and attackers could route
their activities through a different infrastructure, thus compromising the defender’s ability to track their movements. In this instance,
the tactical objective—“hurting” the attacker is achieved, but with
limited strategic value.
•• Collateral Damage. The networked environment is notoriously
unsecure and has historically fallen victim to intentional and unintentional malware spills. Given that key servers may be optimum targets
in cyberwarfare, the possibilities for collateral damage increase,
especially if these servers host important civilian emergency services,
hospitals, or schools. While some may believe some cyber weapons
will have safeguards to prevent collateral damage, historical and
current examples say differently.9 Suspected of having been developed
by nation states,10 Stuxnet was a computer virus designed to target
specific configuration requirements in Siemens software resident on
the centrifuges of the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz. However, the
virus escaped, infecting computers in Azerbaijan, Indonesia, India,
Pakistan, and the United States.11 Another sophisticated cyber weapon
called Flame was designed to spread to other systems over a local
network or via USB drive, with the ability to record audio, capture
screenshots, log keyboard activity, and network traffic.12 Although the
8     US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Washington,
DC: US Department of Defense, July 2011).
9     David Raymond, Gregory Conti, Tom Cross, and Robert Fanelli, A Control Measure
Framework to Limit Collateral Damage and Propagation of Cyber Weapons, http://www.ccdcoe.org/
publications/2013proceedings/d1r2s6_raymond.pdf
10     Nate Anderson, “Confirmed: U.S. and Israel Created Stuxnet, Lost Control of It,” ArsTechnica,
June 1, 2012.
11     Symantec,“W32.Stuxnet,”http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid
=2010-071400-3123-99.
12     Aleks, “The Flame: Questions and Answers,” Secure List, May 28, 2012, https://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193522/The_Flame_Questions_and_Answers.
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apparent targets of this malware were computers in the Middle East,
Flame also propagated outside that area. Microsoft suffered some collateral damage from Flame, which exploited a previously unknown
flaw in the company’s digital certificates to disguise malicious code as
a Microsoft product. The software firm subsequently issued an update
to block other hackers from abusing the fraudulent certificates.13 In
2012, the US Department of Defense signed a directive limiting any
collateral damage from dangerous robotic instruments to “minimize
the probability and consequences of failure.” Yet, while the directive
was set up to create these safeguards, it explicitly “does not apply to
autonomous or semi-autonomous cyberspace systems for cyberspace
operations.”14
•• Escaping into the Wild. An ancillary concern to collateral damage
is having malware circumvent any existing controls and spread across
the Internet. While this effect may not be the intent of a cyberweapon,
when malware interacts with already imperfect information systems,
the potential for undesired effects cannot be overlooked or underestimated. The 1988 Morris Worm, according to its creator, was not
designed to cause damage, but to gauge the size of the Internet.15
Regardless, the worm’s creators lacked knowledge concerning its
potential propagation rate; incomplete testing thus caused the worm to
replicate much faster than anticipated, infecting approximately 60,000
machines.16 If the cyber weapon is self-propagating, like a worm or
virus, then the possibility of it “escaping” remains a real concern,
despite controls. After all, Stuxnet was never intended to travel outside
Natanz’s air gapped networks, but an error in the code caused the
worm to replicate itself when an Iranian technician connected an
infected laptop computer to the Internet.17 One source claimed the
worm spread to at least five countries and as many as 115, including
a Russian nuclear plant.18
•• Friendly Fire. Active cyber defense assumes the attacker is actually
operating from within a certain state’s borders. Should active cyber
defense be successful, adversary nations may relocate their operators
globally and alter their methods of operation. This response would
give attackers the advantage of “disappearing” into the ether as technical and operational data become obsolete. Compounding problems
would occur if attackers operated from not only a third-party country,
but an allied or friendly one. This possibility leads to difficult questions: Can the defender legally and morally attack the infrastructure of
allied or third-party nations without the consent of the host government? Should the defender strike the attacking cyber operator, or the
government directing the attack? How will the defender determine if
13     Aliya Sternstein, “U.S. Moves to Contain Collateral Damage from Cyber Weapons,” Nextgov,
June 19, 2012.
14     
“Pentagon Strips Collateral Damage Safeguards from Cyberwar Weapons,” RT.com,
November 28, 2012.
15     Craig Wright, “What the Law Says About Distributing a Virus,” Infosec Island, September 20,
2011.
16     Carolyn Marsan, “The Morris Worm Turns 20: Look What It’s Done,” Network World,
October 30, 2008.
17     Vincent Manzo, “Stuxent and the Dangers of Cyberwar,” National Interest (January 29, 2013),
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/stuxnet-the-dangers-cyberwar-8030.
18    Vivian Yeo,“Stuxnet Infections Continue to Rise,” ZD Net, August 6, 2010; John Leyden,
“Rogue US-Israel Cyber Weapon Infected Russian Nuclear Plant,” The Register, November 11, 2013..
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whether the government was in fact guiding the attacker?
Two examples underscore the impracticality of active cyber defense
within this context. The first involves the 1998 distributed denial-ofservice attack against Georgia, when the Russian government was
suspected of being involved.19 Technical analysis by Arbor Networks
indicated computers in several countries were used, suggesting a botnet
attack.20 Based on this information, where should a defender direct an
active defense action? A similar example involved GHOSTNET, a large
cyber espionage campaign exploiting computers in 103 countries, particularly those of ministries of foreign affairs and embassies. Should a
defender strike back at hosting or command and control servers in other
countries, thereby encroaching on the sovereignty of a third party? In
both examples, active cyber defense does not seem feasible.
•• Attacker Uses Victim Country. Here, the aggressor initiates attacks
from within the victim country and routes through several hop points
before coming back to the target. This approach would take advantage
of governments’ notoriously horrible bureaucracies and failures of
intelligence and security services to collaborate. By the time confliction is resolved, the attackers have most likely relocated to another
country to resume operations. Additionally, operating out of a victim
country nullifies technical analysis linking attackers with governments
based on “office hours” and holidays.
•• Risk of Counter-Strike . . . and Escalation. There is a real possibility active cyber defense will not deter attackers and, in fact, will
invite a stronger counterattack against more valuable systems. This
is a dangerous scenario; it runs the risk of conflict escalation, particularly if the attacker perceives the active cyber defense response
as disproportionate to the initial attack. Furthermore, a quick and
efficient counterattack reveals to the attacker a sense of the defender’s
capabilities, attribution processes, and the types of tools the defender
has at his disposal. Further complicating matters, if the attribution
was incorrect, the retaliating government could strike the wrong
target, particularly if hasty action is taken.
•• Nonstate Actors. Terrorist groups, hacktivists, and cyber criminals
tend to operate in areas with limited legal restrictions, or government
interference. For example, in 2007, after it was determined pro-Kremlin Russian hacktivists originated distributed denial-of-service attacks
against Estonia, Tallinn submitted requests to Moscow for assistance
in tracking the perpetrators—which were refused.21 If Estonia chose
to conduct retaliatory strikes against Russian interests, it ran the risk
of escalating the crisis. Another iteration of this scenario involves a
nonstate actor operating from a third-party country, neither allied nor
friendly with the victim country. By retaliating against the nonstate
actor, the victim country would encroache on the sovereignty of the
third country. Even if the retaliation was successful, it is not clear it
would achieve any noticeable effect. Assuming extradition is unlikely,
and the actor is essentially shielded by the laws of the host country,
19     Jason Healey, A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986-2012 (Vienna: Cyber Conflict Studies
Association, 2013), 202-203.
20     Jose Nazario, “Georgia DDoS Attacks–A Quick Summary of Observations,” Arbor Networks,
August 12, 2008.
21     Eric Talbot Jensen, “Cyber Deterrence,” Emory International Law Journal, 26 (2012): 805.
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it would be difficult to deter the actor from future activity. Tactical
success (hacking back, destroying the computer, etc.) would not translate into strategic victory.

Aggressive Cyber Defense—One Possible Solution

It is highly unlikely any organization can stop all hostile cyber activity
targeting its information systems. However, it is wrong to think passive
cyber defense has been a failure. Based on multiple surveys, standard
defense-in-depth principles have a valid place in computer security, particularly in countering the significant volume of “known” cyber threats.
Many companies are still not consistent with implementing the most
basic of security procedures. According to one survey, only 45 percent of
responding companies believed they were doing well, and of that, only
10 percent were taking adequate security steps.22 The following points
highlight how, if adhered to, most basic security practices are able to
mitigate the vast majority of malicious cyber activity an organization
encounters on a day-to-day basis:
•• An internationally recognized information security vendor SANS,
developed the fourth iteration of its “Twenty Critical Security
Controls for Effective Cyber Defense (CSC),” baseline security
measures addressing the most common hostile cyber activities.23 For
those organizations properly implementing the CSC, there have been
encouraging signs of success in the reduction of known threats. In
2009, the US Department of State Chief Information Officer implemented the CSC and found 88 percent reduction in vulnerability-based
risks against 85,000 systems.24 In a 2013 survey, 25 percent of 699
respondents from companies ranging from 100 employees to Global
200 stature were able to quantify improvement in their respective risk
postures after implementing the CSC.25
•• In 2011, the Australian government’s Defence Signals Directorate
(DSD) published a revision of its “Strategies to Mitigate Targeted
Intrusions” designed for advanced persistent threat activities. The
strategies listed therein focused on basic information security principles such as patch applications, whitelisting, minimizing the number
of users with administrative privileges, filtering, user education,
host-based and network intrusion detection systems, to name a few.
According to the Australian DSD’s findings, the strategies would have
prevented at least 70 percent of the intrusions the DSD analyzed in
2009, and at least 85 percent of the intrusions responded to in 2010.26
A needed step forward is shifting the mindset of security personnel
from passive cyber defense to an aggressive cyber defense; the difference
is the latter focuses on proactive defensive measures to mitigate lesser
sophisticated attacks (using conventional cybersecurity devices such as
22     James A. Lewis, Raising the Bar for Cybersecurity (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic &
International Studies, February 12, 2013).
23     
SANS Institute, “CSIS: 20 Critical Security Controls,” http://www.sans.org/
critical-security-controls.
24     SANS Institute, “A Brief History of the 20 Critical Security Controls,” http://www.sans.org/
critical-security-controls/history.
25     John Pescatore, “SANS 2013 Critical Security Controls Survey: Moving from Awareness to
Action,” June 2014.
26     Government of Australia, Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions, February 2014.
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intrusion detection systems, firewalls, and antivirus programs), enabling
security professionals to concentrate on more sophisticated cyber threats.
The objective is to build stability through a strong defensive posture
placing emphasis on aggressiveness in defense, not on offense. Through
a combination of strategy, policy, and defensive tactics, techniques, and
procedures, attackers’ success rates should decrease; defenders’ ability
to improve upon resiliency will increase, and the costs associated with
cleaning up after cyber incidents will be greatly reduced.
•• Mitigating Targeted Intrusions. Make it extremely difficult for all
but the most dedicated and persistent adversary to continue hacking.
This serves two goals. First, it deters most attackers looking to target
networks; the theory is there are easier targets to go after. Second, it
will be easier to attribute attackers who are able to intrude on networks
since such intrusions will require a certain level of sophistication and
skill. Combining cognitive and behavioral analyses with technical
analysis should assist in attribution efforts.
•• Honey Pot/Honey Net. Organizations should have a mirror network
to entice attackers to target first, whereby defenders can monitor offensive tactics, techniques, and procedures and apply defensive strategies
to the organizations’ true networks. In 2013 a Trend Micro researcher
created a fake water utility supervisory control and data acquisition
system and observed suspected Chinese espionage agents, known as
“Comment Crew,” gain access to the “honeypot” via an infected MS
Word document, and monitored their movements about the system.27
•• Active Defense Tools. Examples of such tools include those capable
of opening trigger ports on hosts, whereby attackers would automatically get identified and blacklisted. Other tools include those able to
identify the real IP address of a web user, even one behind a proxy;
and those that employ geo-location and a browser’s share function to
pinpoint the physical location of a web user. Last, there are also tools
capable of detecting network-reconnaissance and of feeding attackers
phony information using networks of virtualized decoys.28
•• Denial and Deception. These include techniques used to mislead
attackers through technical solutions. Some examples are the implementation of an operating system that recognizes when an attacker is
downloading a rootkit for installation, and deletes it without notifying
the attacker. Another is the creation of a website that provides files
of data compiled at random from real files to confuse attackers into
seeing nonexistent connections. File transfer utilities that identify
common attack signatures, and pretend to succumb by responding in
the same way an affected system would are useful as well. 29

Conclusion

Active cyber defense can-not curb most malicious activity in
cyberspace. Too many variables make it ineffective and potentially

27     Juha Saarinen, “Chinese Hackers Take Over Fake Water Utility,” ITNews, August 5, 2013.
28     Kelly Jackson Higgins, “Free Active Defense Tools Emerge,” Dark Reading, July 11, 2013.
29     N. Rowe, “Counterplanning Deceptions to Foil Cyber-Attack Plans,” in Information Assurance
Workshop, 2003. IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics Society (West Point: IEEE, 2003),203-211; N. Rowe
and H. Rothstein, “Two Taxonomies of Deception for Attacks on Information Systems,” Journal of
Information Warfare 3, no. 2 (2004): 27-39.
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catastrophic. Attacks have to be destructive to communicate displeasure to the aggressor while ensuring commensurate damage is inflicted.
Therein lies the crux of the problem: being able to identify, execute, and
control a measured destructive response in a timely manner. Cyberspace
is fraught with examples of actor missteps and malware that has escaped
to cause unintended harm to third-party systems. While fortunately
cyber conflicts have not yet escalated into greater military engagements,
this may change as nefarious activity continues without diplomatic,
economic, military repercussion or consequence. There is little empirical evidence on which to base informed judgments concerning cyber
strategies, which in turn increases the risk of unintended consequences.
Moreover, developing offensive cyber capabilities does not preclude
adversaries from constructing similar capabilities. Until a better understanding of how cyberpower can be leveraged as a means of détente,
it is more prudent to increase efforts in building cyber defenses, while
maintaining open dialogues with states to bridge gaps in understanding
and language. In this case, the idea the best defense is a good offense
should be viewed as a last resort, and not as a first choice.

